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Figure 1: We propose using gaze and touch for authentication on smartphones when accessing sensitive data. GazeTouchPIN
is robust against shoulder surfing since it requires attackers to observe the user’s eyes and the touchscreen simultaneously. In
the example the user enters “6641”. Users first select a row of two digits via touch, then gaze left or right to determine the digit
to select. To complicate shoulder surfing, one of two digits layouts is randomly chosen at every entry (e.g., compare A to C).
ABSTRACT
Although mobile devices provide access to a plethora of sensitive
data, most users still only protect themwith PINs or patterns, which
are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (e.g., shoulder surfing). How-
ever, prior research has shown that privacy-aware users are willing
to take further steps to protect their private data. We propose Gaze-
TouchPIN, a novel secure authentication scheme for mobile devices
that combines gaze and touch input. Our multimodal approach
complicates shoulder-surfing attacks by requiring attackers to ob-
serve the screen as well as the user’s eyes to find the password. We
evaluate the security and usability of GazeTouchPIN in two user
studies (N=30). We found that while GazeTouchPIN requires longer
entry times, privacy aware users would use it on-demand when
feeling observed or when accessing sensitive data. The results show
that successful shoulder surfing attack rate drops from 68% to 10.4%
when using GazeTouchPIN.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Human-centered computing→ Human computer interac-
tion (HCI);
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices enable access to sensitive data – including personal
photos, call logs, or emails – resulting in a need to protect access
to such devices. Users lock their phones using different methods
such as PINs, lock patterns, and biometrics (e.g., fingerprint) [10].
The former two are vulnerable to shoulder surfing [5, 7, 12, 24],
thermal attacks [1], and smudge attacks [2, 19, 25]. While biometric
authentication is less susceptible to these attacks, biometric data
can be stolen remotely [21, 30], and cannot be changed once leaked.
There is a need for a wide range of authentication mechanisms
to fit different user preferences, tasks and contexts. Meanwhile, ad-
vances in remote gaze estimation enable eye tracking [11, 27] and
gaze gestures detection [12, 13, 22, 28] using the front-facing cam-
eras of unmodified mobile devices. These advances enable systems
to use gaze for mobile authentication [12, 13, 16, 20].
In this work, we propose a novel multimodal authentication
scheme that combines gaze and touch input for secure user authenti-
cation on off-the-shelf mobile devices (see Figure 1). GazeTouchPIN
is particularly useful for situations where users are feeling observed,
or if they are accessing private data in sensitive contexts (e.g., in
public transport [7]). It is highly secure against two advanced threat
models that we describe later.
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Figure 2: The usability study setup. Camera A recorded the
phone screen (phone-view) to observe the touch input. Cam-
era B recorded the participant’s face (eyes-view) to observe
the eye movements. Camera C simultaneously recorded the
screen and the user’s eyes (side-view).
The contributions of this work are two-fold. First, we introduce
the concept and implementation of GazeTouchPIN, a novel multi-
modal authentication scheme that secures mobile devices against
two advanced shoulder-surfing attacks. Second, we report on an
evaluation of our system with regard to usability and security ac-
cording to criteria identified by Schaub et al. [18] and compare it
to state-of-the-art authentication schemes.
2 THREAT MODELS
To cover basic and advanced attacks, our scheme addresses two
threat models. For both models the user is in a public space. The
attacker knows how to authenticate, but does not know the PIN.
Both models require monitoring both the device’s touchscreen as
well as the user’s eyes:
Side attack model. The user is observed from a viewpoint that
shows the user’s gaze input and touch input (e.g., in a train). The
distance to the user is close enough to see the touchscreen, but
far enough to reduce the effort of switching focus back and forth
between the user’s eyes and the device’s touchscreen (Figure 2C).
Iterative attack model. The attacker is able to observe the
user several times (e.g., a colleague at work [26]). The attacker
exclusively focuses on one modality per observation – for example,
first on the users’ eyes and then on the input on the screen, or
vice versa (Figures 2A and 2B). The challenges are to (a) correctly
remember both sequences and (b) to correctly combine them later.
3 GAZETOUCHPIN
Based on these threat models we propose GazeTouchPIN, a multi-
modal authentication scheme that requires touch-based selection
as well as gaze gestures. The system is implemented as an Android
application and does not require any additional hardware. Instead,
gaze gestures are detected using the front-facing camera. We detect
the user’s face and eyes using the Viola-Jones detector [23]. Gaze
gestures are detected using a calibration-free gaze estimation ap-
proach [29]. The distance between the face’s center and the pupil
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Figure 3: Layout (a) was used for touch-only (the baseline).
Layouts (b) and (c) are the only two possible layouts for the
touch+random as well as for GazeTouchPIN.
for the left (dlef t ) and right (dr iдht ) eyes is measured. Gaze direc-
tions are then estimated based on the ratio dlef t : dr iдht ; e.g., if
dlef t > dr iдht , we conclude that the user is looking to the left.
GazeTouchPIN augments PIN selection by splitting the input
into two stages. Users first select the row containing the required
digit using touch and then choose one of both digits by looking
left or right (see Figure 1). The layout of the shown digits is chosen
randomly at every input (i.e., the layout changes 4 times when
entering a 4-digit PIN). We use only two layouts to support learning
effects and avoid any cognitive load caused by selecting from a
totally random arrangement (see Figures 3B and 3C) .
(1) touch-only (Figure 3a): uses a PIN keypad (baseline).
(2) touch+random (Figures 3b and 3c): uses touch to select the de-
sired digit from one of two randomly shuffling layouts. This
will provide insights about the shuffling idea and help distin-
guish the impact of the multimodal factor on the usability
and security of GazeTouchPIN.
(3) GazeTouchPIN (Figures 3b and 3c) uses touch input to select
a pair of horizontally aligned PIN digits and then a gaze-
gesture to the left/right to select the desired PIN.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Usability Study
We started with a usability study to collect realistic password entries
for a subsequent security study and to compare the usability of
the three methods. The study was designed as a repeated measures
experiment. Participants entered 6 pre-defined PINs using all three
authentication methods. We logged all authentication attempts and
showed the home screen after successful logins. We recorded the
participants using three HD video cameras as shown in Figure 2.
4.1.1 Participants and Procedure. We recruited 12 participants
(2 females), aged between 19 and 31 years (M = 24.8, SD = 3.6),
who had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Upon arrival, the
experimenter explained the study and asked the participant to
sign a consent form. The experimenter then started the applica-
tion, handed the phone to the participant, and described how it
works. Each participant then performed three training runs, one
per condition, to get acquainted with the system. Those runs were
excluded from further analyses. At each authentication attempt,
the experimenter read out the PIN and input method according to
a previously generated randomized list. The list was randomized
to avoid frequent consecutive gaze inputs, which leads to fatigue
and in turn influences performance and acceptance [14]. The par-
ticipant would then enter the PIN until successful. We concluded
with an interview.
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Figure 4: Untrained users need more time using GazeTouch-
PIN than when using touch+random and touch-only. Gaze-
TouchPIN users performed faster by time; mean input time
decreased from 10.8 to 9.5 seconds at the sixth entry.
4.1.2 Results. In total we recorded 54 videos per participant (6
passwords × 3 methods × 3 camera views). Apart from the videos,
we analyzed the data with regard to input speed and error rate.
Input Speed. Figure 4 summarizes the time needed to authenti-
cate for each method. Prior to analysis, we excluded 2 out of 216
input time measurements as outliers (> µ + 2.5×SD). A repeated
measures ANOVA showed significant effects for method on input
speed (F1.021,9.192 = 156.106, p < 0.001). Post-hoc analyses using
Bonferroni correction revealed that there is a significant difference
(p < 0.001) in input speed between touch-only input (M = 1677,
SD = 120) and GazeTouchPIN input (M = 10817, SD = 712). There
is also a significant difference (p < 0.001) between touch+random
input (M = 3210, SD = 124) and GazeTouchPIN input (M = 10817,
SD = 712). The third pair (touch-only vs touch+random) is also
significantly different (p < 0.001).
Error Rate. Using a Pearson chi-square test we could not find
a statistically significant effect of method on error rate χ2(11) =
12,p = 0.364. However we found a tendency to make less errors
as participants entered more PINs using GazeTouchPIN, which
suggests that there is a learning effect. For example, 10 out of 12
participants entered their fifth and sixth PIN correctly on their first
attempt. Participants 2 and 6 never failed, while participants 1, 7
and 11 failed once each. Finally, participant 4 improved steadily
from 4 failures at the first PIN to no failures at the last one.
Qualitative Feedback. Participants noted that the touch+random
and GazeTouchPIN are more secure than the regular touch-only
method. Despite longer login times, all participants agreed that with
training they would be able to enter PINs faster. This aligns with
the quantitative data, which showed that the mean input time of the
participants’ first entry using GazeTouchPIN is 10.8 seconds, which
decreased to 9.5 seconds at their sixth entry using GazeTouchPIN.
Participants imagined GazeTouchPIN to be particularly useful in
situations where they are more exposed, such as in public transport.
Also using the approach as a second layer of authentication for
particular cases (e.g., online banking applications, or for opening
messages from a specific person) was mentioned as an application
area. Overall while one participant reported that he would use Gaze-
TouchPIN for frequent phone unlocking, 10 participants reported
they would use it to protect sensitive data or in situations where
they feel observed. This suggests that GazeTouchPIN is attractive
for security-aware users, while less concerned users would use it
in sensitive contexts.
4.2 Security Study
In this study we focused on the security of the three methods.
The study also followed a repeated-measures design. Participants
attacked passwords entered using all three methods and observed
from all views using the videos recorded during the usability study.
In total, each participant attacked 24 PIN entries – 8 for eachmethod,
(1) 12 were iterative attacks, each required watching an eyes video
and a phone video, and (2) 12 were side attacks, each required a
side view video. Participants performed half of the 24 attacks using
the side-view and the other half using the phone-view and the
eyes-view. For iterative attacks against the GazeTouchPIN method,
participants were provided both the eyes-view as well as the phone-
view. Half of these started by the eyes-view, while the other half
started with the phone-view. For any two observations against
GazeTouchPIN, there is a 12n chance that the phone-view and the
eyes-view match. Hence, we randomly assigned the views such
that there was a 116 chance for a match (4-digit PINs). The order of
methods was randomized per participant. To avoid learning effects,
no participant attacked the same password from different views.
4.2.1 Participants and Procedure. We recruited 18 participants
(5 females) aged between 18 and 36 (M = 24.6, SD = 4.54). None
had participated in the usability study. Participants were compen-
sated with a 10 Euro gift voucher. In addition, all participants took
part in a draw for an additional 20 Euro gift voucher, where their
chances of winning the draw increased with the number of suc-
cessfully attacked passwords. Participants were introduced to the
study procedure and the reward mechanism, the experimenter then
explained the system and participants could try the app themselves.
They were then given draft papers and the experimenter started
playing the videos. All videos were watched once. Participants were
allowed to examine the layouts at any time during the study (see
Figure 3). Participants provided up to three guesses based on their
observations. In case of iterative attacks, the experimenter alter-
nated the order at which the participant watched the videos, i.e., in
half of the cases the participant watched the eyes-view first, while
in the other half the participant watched the phone-view first. The
study was concluded with a semi-structured interview.
4.2.2 Results. In total, participants performed 18 × 24 = 432
attacks, providing three guesses for each.
Successful Attacks. We calculated the Levenshtein distance
between the guesses and the correct PIN. Out of the three guesses,
the guess with the least distance to the correct PIN (i.e., the guess
that is closest to the correct PIN) was considered for further analysis.
We also calculated the overall success rate in attacking PINs for
each input method and view angle. An attack is successful if at
least one of the 3 guesses matches the correct password. Figure 5
shows the rate of successful attacks against PINs entered using
each method through each view.
A repeated measures ANOVA showed significant main effects
for input method (F2,34 = 42.36, p < 0.001) on attack success. This
means that the distance between the guesses and the correct PIN
depends on the input method. Post-hoc analysis using Bonferroni
correction revealed that there is a significant difference (p < 0.001)
in the distances for PINs entered using GazeTouchPIN (M = 1.88,
SD = 0.11) compared to touch-only PINs (M = 0.65, SD = 0.1).







Figure 5: Success rate of attacking PINs entered using the
three methods. GazeTouchPIN is themost secure among the
tested methods, in particular against iterative attacks.
There is also a significant difference (p < 0.005) in the distances for
PINs entered using GazeTouchPIN (M = 1.88, SD = 0.11) compared
to touch+random PINs (M = 1.37, SD = 0.13). The final pair is also
significantly different (p < 0.001). This means that guesses against
PINs are statistically closer to the correct PIN in case of touch-only
PINs, followed by touch+random PINs. However guesses against
GazeTouchPIN PINs are the least similar to the correct one.
Interviews. All participants reported that attacking multimodal
PINs (GazeTouchPIN) through the side-view is the most difficult
task. Some attributed this to the difficulty of focusing on the eyes
and phone in parallel, particularly if the users were fast in entering
their password. “It is just very hard to concentrate on two numbers,
look at his eyes, then again at the screen”, said P0. One participant
noted that she had to keep track of: (1) the user’s finger, (2) which
layout is displayed and (3) the eye movements. Another participant
added that it is particularly difficult when multiple fingers are used.
Multiple attackers indicated that shuffling the layout confused them.
5 DISCUSSION
Successful iterative attack rate against GazeTouchPIN is very low
(only 4.2% success rate). An attacker who observes all touch inputs
through the phone-view would still have to try 2n possibilities to
find the correct PIN combination (where n is the number of digits
in the PIN) because of the randomness of the layout. When observ-
ing the eyes-view, the attacker would not know which layout the
user is responding to. There is only a 12n chance that the attacker
observes a matching phone-view and eyes-view. For this reason
GazeTouchPIN is highly resistant to iterative attacks. Side attacks
perform better than iterative attacks (17% success rate) as the adver-
sary expects gaze-input right after touch input. However success
rate is still very low compared to the other methods due to having
to switch focus back and forth between the eyes and the screen
(see Figure 5). Successful attack rates against GazeTouchPIN show
that it is a significant improvement over state-of-the-art gaze-based
authentication schemes, such as 42% [3], 55% [6], 15% – 63% [12],
and 60% [17]. GazeTouchPass [12] uses passwords that consist of
gaze input and touch input (e.g., gaze(left), touch(1), gaze(right),
touch(2)), while GazeTouchPIN uses gaze and touch in addition to
a random layout to enter a 4-digit PIN. This makes GazeTouchPIN
(A) more secure against iterative attacks (only 4.2% success rate)
compared to GazeTouchPass (42% success rate [12]), and (B) com-
patible with existing backends that accept PINs. Our work shows
how multimodal authentication can be made resilient against it-
erative attacks, which GazeTouchPass [15] is vulnerable to. Our
system also compares well with non-gaze systems such as XSide [4]
which had a success rate of 9% – 38%. Additionally, GazeTouchPIN
does not require hardware modifications, and is resilient to smudge
and thermal attacks by design since the entire password cannot be
recovered from the touchscreen.
It should be noted that all previous conclusions are based on
the assumption that the attacker knows how GazeTouchPIN works.
The threat models we propose are realistic but also ensure opti-
mal attacking conditions. Additionally, participants of the security
studies were highly motivated and trained. This is evidenced from
their performance against the baselines which was as high as 75%
(see Figure 5), which is comparable to results from state-of-the-art
schemes; attackers of ColorSnakes [9] and XSide [4] achieved 75%
and 53% success rate against the respective baselines.
The usability analysis of GazeTouchPIN revealed that authen-
tication speed is, despite being slower than single modal input,
faster than many other state-of-the-art multimodal authentication
systems. For example, 15 s [17], 9.6 s [16], 12.5 s [3], 48.5 s [6], 36.7 s
[8], 9.2 s – 12.1 s [15]. Furthermore, as it is based on only two lay-
outs, we expect users to become faster as they use the system more
frequently due to training effects. This is evident in the quantitative
results, which show that mean login time using GazeTouchPIN
decreases from 10.8 seconds to 9.5 seconds as participants used
it more often. Since users unlock their phones almost 50 times a
day [10], we recommend the use of GazeTouchPIN in sensitive
contexts rather than on regular basis. Overall, and as several par-
ticipants indicated, multimodal authentication can be particularly
useful as a secondary authentication mechanism that users can
choose to opt to when feeling observed (e.g., public setting), or
when accessing critical data (e.g., online banking). A limitation is
that users do not always hold the phone in a way that shows the
eyes. The systemmight not detect both eyes if the phone is too close
to the face. Future work can guide users into an optimal posture.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work we proposed GazeTouchPIN, a novel scheme that com-
bines gaze and touch for highly secure multimodal authentication
on mobile devices. Our findings show that GazeTouchPIN is sig-
nificantly secure against both iterative and side shoulder surfing
attacks. Its usability is comparable to related work, making it suit-
able for use when feeling observed or when accessing sensitive
data. We expect these advantages to multiply with further advances
in remote gaze estimation on mobile devices. In the future we plan
to evaluate our system against other threat models such as video
attacks [24], insiders [26], and multiple observers.
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